all aspects of the National Missile Defense debate in the coming months to ensure that whatever course we choose truly strengthen our national security and advance our national interests.

IS THIS SHIELD NECESSARY?

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 13, 2001]

(Samuel R. Berger)

In the first weeks of the Bush administration, national missile defense has risen to the top of the national security agenda. Having wrestled with this issue over the last years of the Clinton administration, I believe it would be a mistake to proceed pell-mell with missile defense deployment as though all legitimate questions about the system had been answered. They have not.

While the United States maintains strength unmatched in the world, the vulnerability of the American people to attack here at home by weapons of mass destruction is greater than ever. Dealing with our vulnerability to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons requires an ambitious, robust, comprehensive strategy.

But 20 years and tens of billions of dollars later, national missile defense is still a question-ridden response to the least likely of the threats posed by these weapons: a long-range ballistic missile launched by an outlaw nation.

President Clinton last year decided to continue research and development of national missile defense, but deferred a decision on deployment. In part, this was based on a judgment that we do not yet know whether it will work reliably. The Bush administration should reject arbitrary deadlines and, as part of Secretary Rumsfeld's laudable defense review, take a fresh look at the overall threat we face.

Without question we need to broaden America's defenses against weapons of mass destruction. But plunging ahead with missile defense deployment before critical questions are answered is looking through the telescope from the wrong end: from the perspective of bureaucratically driven technology rather than that of the greatest vulnerabilities of the American people.

President Reagan's global shield (SDI) has evolved into a more limited system aimed at defeating long-range missiles launched not by a major nuclear rival but by an irrational leader of a hostile nation, particularly North Korea, Iraq or Iran. Its premise is that an aggressive tyrant such as Saddam Hussein is less likely to be deterred than were the leaders of the Soviet Union by the prospect that an attack on us or our friends would provoke devastating retaliation.

It is further suggested that lack of a defense could intimidate U.S. leadership: We might have hesitated to liberate Kuwait if we knew Saddam could have delivered a chemical, biological or nuclear weapon to the United States with a long-range ballistic missile.

But why do we believe Saddam or his malevolent counterparts would be less susceptible to deterrence than Stalin or his successors? Indeed, dictators such as Saddam tend to stay in power so long because of their obsession with self-protection. And is it likely we would not use every means at our disposal to respond to a vital threat to our economic lifeline, even if it meant preemptively taking out any long-range missiles the other side might have?

The fact is that a far greater threat to the American people is the delivery of weapons of mass destruction by means far less sophisticated than an ICBM: a ship, plane or suitcase. The tragedies of the USS Cole and sarin gas in the Tokyo subway show that lethal power does not need to ride on a long-range missile.

We know that we increasingly are the target of a widespread network of anti-American terrorists. We know they are seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction. If deterrence arguably doesn't work against hostile nations, it is even less so for fanatical terrorists with no clear home address.

The real issue is what is the most cost-effective way to spend an additional 100 billion or more defense dollars to protect this country from the greatest WMD threats. In that broader context, is national missile defense our first priority?

Is it wiser to continue research and development and explore alternative technologies while we invest in substantially intensifying the broad-scale, long-term effort against terrorist enemies? (Such an effort would include increased intelligence resources, heightened border security, even training of local police and public health officials to recognize a deadly biological agent.)

The ultimate question is whether Americans will be more secure with or without a national missile defense. The answer is not self-evident. We can't build the system that is farthest along in development—a land-based one—without cooperation from our allies.

Their misgivings derive in significant part from the prospect of abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia; that could unravel the global arms control and nonproliferation system.

It has been suggested that we could address Europeans' concerns by including them in our missile defense system or helping them build their own. But such an amalgamation would be more capable against Russia and thus more likely to stiffen its resistance to change in the ABM; it could also increase the chance Russia would respond in ways that would reduce strategic stability—for example by retaining multiple-warhead ICBMs it has agreed to eliminate.

Of course no other country can ever have a veto over decisions we must take to protect our national security. But in making that judgment, we must understand that the basic logic of the ABM has not been repealed—that if either side has a defensive system the other believes can neutralize its offensive capabilities, mutual deterrence is undermined and the world is a less safe place.

Then there is China. It is suggested that we can work this out with China by at least implicitly giving it a ''green light'' to build up its ICBM arsenal to levels that would not be threatened by our national missile defense.

This strategy fails to take into account the dynamic it could unleash in Asia: Would China's missile buildup stimulate advocates of nuclear weapons in Japan? How would India view this ''separate peace'' between the United States and China? What effect would that have on Pakistan and the Koreas?

Will we be more secure as Americans with a missile defense system or less secure? It is not a question that answers itself. But it is a question that requires answers.

JERUSALEM EMBASSY RELOCATION ACT OF 1995

HON. THOMAS G. TANCREDO

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 13, 2001

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Speaker, today I introduced a resolution expressing the sense of Congress with respect to relocating the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. In 1995, Congress passed the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Act of 1995, which states that as recognition of an undivided Israel, the U.S. Embassy should be moved to Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999. The bill, which President Clinton signed, also contains waiver authority that the president may exercise if he feels the embassy move should be delayed for national security reasons. Each year since the bill was passed, the President has issued a national security waiver, and the Embassy has still not been moved.

The recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital enjoys the broad support of the American public. Further, it would be consistent with the United States' practice of accepting the host nation's decision as to where its capital is, and where the U.S. Embassy is located. Currently, Israel is the only nation in which the U.S. Embassy is not located in a city recognized internationally as the capital.

In short, moving the Embassy to Jerusalem is consistent with U.S. policy, and does not infringe on the remaining issues of conflict over East Jerusalem. I call my colleagues to support this resolution and I am hopeful that the House International Relations Committee will consider it in the coming weeks. Finally Mr. Speaker, I submit for the RECORD the following essay, written by one of my constituents, which makes the case for an embassy move most eloquently:

RELOCATION OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY TO JERUSALEM: A PROPOSITION WHOSE TIME HAS COME

(By Cheston David Mizel)

ENGLEWOOD, CO.—On May 22, 2000 President George W. Bush, speaking in front of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, promised that he would begin to move the U.S. Ambassador from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem as soon as he was inaugurated. Now that he has been elected and the inauguration has passed, the time to move the U.S. Embassy has come. Moving the embassy, at this time, is not only morally and politically apropos, but would augment vital American interests by sending a clear and unequivocal message, to the region, reaffirming the vitality of the American-Israeli relationship.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and relocation of the U.S. Embassy would immediately and significantly bolster the President's standing with key constituencies on both sides of the aisle. Not only would it clearly demonstrate his determination to fulfill his campaign promises, but it would garner enormous favor among Jewish voters who have felt disenfranchised by the recent presidential election. The prompt relocation of the embassy would further the President's goal of uniting

MORAL IMPLICATIONS

An immediate relocation of the American Embassy is a morally appropriate decision. Israel is the only true western style democracy in a region dominated by ruthless dictatorships. Israel and the United States enjoy a relationship that is unparalleled in the region. Israel is clearly the most loyal pro-American state in the Middle East. Moreover, since biblical times, Jerusalem has always been considered the capital of the people of Israel, whether residing in their land